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clear cut situations as where identity is the issue common to the two
trials, will res judicata retain its usefulness in protecting defendants
from double exposure to the deliberations of their peers.
The majority's determination of the broad question of whether
there were two conspiracies or only one is equally ominous. In such
a decidedly factual question, the formalistic approach of the court
in fixing largely upon the wording of the charges is not the most
fruitful approach.
In view of the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada in this case there is now considerable doubt as to the availability of the defence of res judicata in cases which involve criminal
conspiracy.
P.G.J.

Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co., [1963] S.C.R. 154.
Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company,' a Supreme
Court of Canada decision, decided that the standard of proof applicable in a civil case where it is necessary to prove a criminal act is the
balance of probabilities test rather than the more stringent test in
criminal proceedings proper of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The double standard of proof for civil and criminal cases, established in the nineteenth century, has been the subject of unclear
2
consideration by the courts, much discussion and much criticism.
The respondent insurance company brought this action against
the appellant Hanes, pursuant to the provisions of The InsuranceAct,
Ontario, for reimbursement of $22,174.85 paid by it towards satisfaction of a judgment against the appellant. The appellant was insured
by the respondent under a standard automobile insurance policy and
was the unsuccessful litigant in an action arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. The respondent alleged that the sum paid was one
which it would not have been liable to pay except for the provisions
of s. 214(1) and (3) (ii) of the Insurance Act because the appellant
at the time of the accident was "under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to such an extent as to be for the time being incapable of the
proper control of the automobile" within the meaning of the prohibition in statutory condition 2(1) (a) of the policy.
The trial judge thought that on the reasonable balance of probabilities the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to the extent specified in condition 2(1) (a) but he was also of the
opinion that he was bound to be satisfied "beyond reasonable doubt"
1 [19631 S.C.R. 154.
2 G. H. L. Fridman, Standardsof Proof, (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 665. As a
result of the instant case there is more certainty as to standards of proof, but
the definition of the standards may still give rise to confusion.

1964]

Supreme Court Review

since it was a criminal act to drive while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, hence he ruled for the defendant.
In the Court of Appeal Porter C.J. was of the opinion that the
trial judge used the correct standard of proof, but the other two
judges allowed the appeal upon another issue. A new trial was
ordered but this decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The trial judge followed the case of London Life Insurance Co. v.
Trustee of the Property of Lang Shirt Co. Ltd.,3 as interpreted in
Earnshaw v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.4 In the
Earnshaw case Robertson C.J.O. interpreted Mignault J. in the Lang
Shirt case as laying down the proposition that criminal acts in civil
trials must be proved by the same standard applicable to criminal
trials, namely beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court Justices examined these two cases in the
light of several others and decided that Robertson C.J.O. had misinterpreted the following passage from the Lang Shirt cast:
That there
imputation
lrroof of a
imputation

is in the law of evidence, a legal presumption against the
of crime, requiring, before crime can be held to be established,
no such
more cogent character than in ordinary cases where
is made, does not appear to admit of doubt. 5

The Supreme Court majority felt that the words "of a more
cogent character" are by no means synonymous with "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt"; Mignault J. did not intend that the same standard
of proof as used in criminal cases should be applied to civil cases
where criminal acts must be proved, as he said:
•.. while the rule is not so strict in civil cases as in criminal I think that
when a right or defence rests upon the suggestion that conduct is criminal
or quasi-criminal, the court should be satisfied not only that the circumstances proved are consistent with the commission of the suggested act,
but that the facts are such as to be inconsistent with any other rational
conclusion that the evil act was in fact committed.
In the early case of Cooper v. Slade6 which involved a quasicriminal issue in a civil case the House of Lords supported the proposition that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict.
The instant case is significant since it considers the policy reasons
for the double standard of proof. The consequence of finding a man
guilty in a criminal case often involves his very liberty, and individual
liberty is the basis of the English judicial system. In civil cases,
however, we are balancing the interests between two litigants and
not between the state and an individual member of society.
3 [1929] S.C.R. 117.
4 [1943] O.R. 385.
5 Supra,footnote 3 at p. 125.
6 (1858) 6 H.L. Cas. 746.
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Despite diverse decisions as to the standard of proof required
in civil cases, the Supreme Court feels that the weight of authority
favours the balance of probability as the proper test. Phipson 7 and
Wigmore s support the position here adopted by the Supreme Court.
It is submitted that this decision is not entirely unequivocal as
to the standards of proof because the court incorporated in their
decision Denning L.J.'s statement in Bater and Bater:9
The difference of opinion which has been evoked about the standard of
proof in these cases may well turn out to be more a matter of words than
anything else. It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of
proof in criminal cases than in civil cases but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolutet standard in either case. In criminal
cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may
be degrees of proof within that standard. Many great judges have said
that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be
clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance
of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject
matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally
require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require
if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so
high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge
of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability
which is commensurate with the occasion.

Denning L.J. pondered the meaning of real and substantial doubt
(that is reasonable doubt) and decided that "reasonable doubt" could
aptly be used as a test in civil or divorce cases or in criminal cases.
The only difference is that a doubt might be regarded as reasonable
in a criminal case yet not in a civil case. By adopting this attitude
Denning L.J. made a further illusory and subtle distinction based on
the old modes of speech which can only further the semantic confusion
already patent in the field.
It is submitted that the two standards of proof are incapable
of accurate definition, and are meaningful only as guide lines in the
context of the facts of a particular case. To be realistic one must
admit that there are varying standards within these standards which
are constantly applied in our courts.
The Wawanesa case settles in Canada a long policy dispute and
in doing so, it restates the real purpose of the dichotomy of standards.
When balancing the interests between individuals within our society
"a balance of probabilities" is to be our guide line, and the more
serious the ramifications the more proof the court will require to be
satisfied. However, when the state has accused a man of a crime and
threatens to fine him or take away his liberty, the consequences of
making a mistake are so great that an accused should be convicted
only if the acts of which he is accused are proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
C.S.R.
7 Phipson On Evidence, (9th ed.), p. 9.

S Wigmore, On Evidence, 3rd ed., para. 2498 at p. 327.
9 [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at p. 459.

